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PROTECTING THE SPIRITUAL BELIEFS
OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES–AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDIES
Michael Blakeney†
Abstract:
This article examines the extent to which the spiritual beliefs of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples are protected under current Australian law.
The first significant recognition by the High Court of Australia of the legal rights of
indigenous peoples was in relation to native title over real property. As those peoples
define their status and society by reference to their relationship with the land, this article
considers the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to protect their spiritual beliefs as an
incident of native title law. It reviews a line of intellectual property cases which have
been a more fruitful source of protection, as well as the possibilities of the protection of
the spiritual beliefs of indigenous peoples under racial vilification laws. With changes to
the Australian Constitution to recognize the particular rights of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Peoples currently under consideration, the article concludes with the
speculation that specific Federal legislation could achieve the protection of their spiritual
beliefs.

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES OF AUSTRALIA

AND

TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER

Carbon-dated human remains provide evidence of at least 60,000
years of the occupation of Australia by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples.1 When the first white settlers arrived in 1788, an estimated 300,000
to more than one million Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples
inhabited the Australian continent.2 Aboriginal society comprised hundreds
of language groups of varying sizes. 3 Each language group shared a
common language, territory and cultural attributes.4 Until the formation of
the Australian Federation in 1901, the current States and Territories of
Australia were separate British Colonies, each pursuing their own policies
concerning the recognition or repression of indigenous culture and
traditional life. 5 Similar to other colonized countries 6 with indigenous

†

Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia.
Amanda H. Lynch, et al., Using the Paleorecord to Evaluate Climate and Fire Interactions in
Australia, 35 ANN. REV. OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 215, 228 (2007).
2
E. Bourke, Australia’s First Peoples: Identity and Population, in ABORIGINAL STUDIES: AN
INTRODUCTORY READER IN ABORIGINAL STUDIES 38 (C. Bourke, E. Bourke & W.H. Edwards eds., 2d ed.
1998).
3
See R. M. W. DIXON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN LANGUAGES: THEIR NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT
(2002).
4
RICHARD BROOME, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS: BLACK RESPONSES TO WHITE DOMINANCE 9 (2d
ed. 1994).
5
For a recent historiographical review of Aboriginal history, see Bain Attwood, Aboriginal History,
Minority Histories and Historical Wounds, 14 POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 171 (2011).
1
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communities, there were cyclical periods of tolerance, protection, or even
qualified approval interspersed with periods of rejection when attempts were
made to eradicate traditional ways and to “assimilate” Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Peoples, by seeking to absorb them and deny them any
separate identity.7 Probably the most notorious example of the latter was the
policy of forcible removal of Aboriginal children from their parents to be
brought up by fostering institutions as members of the white community.
This policy commenced in colonial times until as recently as the 1970s.8
At the time when the instructions were being prepared by the British
Colonial Office for Arthur Phillip, the first Governor of the first Australian
Colony, the legal theory which underpinned those instructions was that of
William Blackstone,9 that the Australian continent was “terra nullius”10 with
the consequence that all applicable English laws were immediately in force
in the colony. No account was taken of the laws or belief systems of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, as they would have been if
Australia had been regarded as a conquered colony in the Blackstonian
sense.11 In 1788, when the First Fleet of white settlers arrived in Australia,
no overarching Aboriginal political system existed to link the many
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples to resist colonization.12 The
historical record of Aboriginal Resistance to white settlement, and indeed
whether Australia should have been regarded as a conquered or settled
colony in the Blackstonian sense, is the subject of a vigorous contemporary
debate.13 However, as far as Australian jurisprudence is concerned, the High
6

See, e.g., TASK FORCE THREE: FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE 6-7 (1976).
7
See the authorities referred to in Tim Rowse, The Reforming State, the Concerned Public and
Indigenous Political Actors, 56 AUSTRALIAN J. OF POL. & HIST. 66 (2010).
8
See BRINGING THEM HOME, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF
ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES (Canberra, Commonwealth
of Australia 1997).
9
GEORGE CHASE, BLACKSTONE (37) COMMENTARIES, Bk. I, ch. 4, 106-108.
10
Meaning “land belonging to no one.”
11
See the discussion in Ulla Secher, The Mabo Decision–Preserving the Distinction Between
'Settled' and 'Conquered or Ceded' Territories, 24 UNIV. OF QUEENSLAND L.J. 35 (2005).
12
See, e.g., IAN KEEN, ABORIGINAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AUSTRALIA AT THE THRESHOLD OF
COLONISATION (2004).
13
The leading antagonist is Henry Reynolds. See, e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, FRONTIER: ABORIGINES,
SETTLERS AND LAND (1996); KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE, THE FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY:
VOLUME ONE, VAN DIEMEN’S LAND, 1803-1847 (2003). Among the avalanche of historiography generated
by this controversy are WHITEWASH: ON KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE'S FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY
(Robert Manne ed., 2003); STUART MACINTYRE AND ANNA CLARK, THE HISTORY WARS (2004); JOHN
DAWSON, WASHOUT: ON THE ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO THE FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY (2004);
BAIN ATTWOOD, TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT ABORIGINAL HISTORY (2005); GENOCIDE AND SETTLER
SOCIETY: FRONTIER VIOLENCE AND STOLEN INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY (A. Dirk
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Court of Australia in its celebrated 1992 decision Mabo v. Queensland (No.
2)14 held that:
[W]hatever the justification advanced in earlier days for
refusing to recognize the rights and interests in land of the
indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and
discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be
accepted . . . It is imperative in today’s world that the common
law should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of
racial discrimination. The fiction by which the rights and
interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as nonexistent was justified by a policy which has no place in the
contemporary law of this country.15
This article examines whether this more enlightened attitude, formulated in
the context of land law, extends to protecting the spiritual beliefs of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. As will be seen below, the
High Court of Australia took the position in Western Australia v Ward16 that
these spiritual beliefs are adequately protected by intellectual property (“IP”)
law. This article will show that Australian IP law falls short in this regard,
although some faith has been placed in the possibility of the reworking of
the international IP environment through the promulgation by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) of international conventions
dealing with the protection of traditional cultural expressions and traditional
knowledge.
II.

ABORIGINAL SPIRITUALITY

The central tenet of traditional Aboriginal beliefs is the “Dreamtime,”
described for the first time by anthropologists in the late nineteenth century
to refer to their understanding of the Aboriginal explanation of the creation
by of the world by Ancestral Beings who emerged at the dawn of creation
from the earth and from spirit homes in the sky.17 Some Ancestral Beings
Moses ed., 2005); TONY TAYLOR, DENIAL. HISTORY BETRAYED (2008); JAMES BOYCE, VAN DIEMEN’S
LAND (2008).
14
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
15
Frank Brennan S.J., Mabo and Its Implications for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, in
MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUATION (M.A. Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993).
16
[2002] HCA 28 (Austl.).
17
See Patrick Wolfe, On Being Woken Up: The Dreamtime in Anthropology and in Australian
Settler Culture, 32 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 197 (1991). On the other hand, Drahos suggests that it
would be preferable to refer to Aboriginal “cosmologies” in describing the connections between different
parts or objects of the Aboriginal knowledge system, linking a place, a painting, an object, a word and a
ceremony. Peter Drahos, When Cosmology Meets Property: Indigenous People’s Innovation and
Intellectual Property, 29 PROMETHEUS 233, 237 (2011).
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assumed forms that combined features of humans with other species, such as
kangaroos, crocodiles, tortoises or birds.18 As they traveled over the earth,
the Ancestral Beings created the sea and sky and the physical characteristics
of the landscape, such as mountains, rivers and waterholes. 19 They also
created the sacred rules of human social life and culture that were passed on
to human beings.20 The Ancestral Beings entrusted custodianship of certain
areas of land to particular language groups on the condition that they
observed these sacred rules. Different tribes or clans have different creator
ancestors who are venerated in much the same way as are the sacred figures
of, for example, the Christian religion.21 Dreaming places, or sacred sites,
are a constant reminder of the presence and power of the Ancestral Beings
and represent the bond between the people and the land. 22 Finally, for
Aboriginal Peoples the Dreamtime remains relevant to and connected with
the present, and will endure forever.23
A.

The Wandjina

The Wandjina 24 are the creator ancestors of a number of the
Aboriginal Peoples 25 of the Kimberley region 26 of the northern part of
Western Australia. 27 These peoples believe that the Wandjina were the
cloud and rain spirits who created the landscape and the animals and peoples
within it. 28 The Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples also believe that the
18
See HOWARD MORPHY, ANCESTRAL CONNECTIONS: ART AND AN ABORIGINAL SYSTEM OF
KNOWLEDGE 221 (1991).
19
Id. at 220-22.
20
See LYNNE HUME, ANCESTRAL POWER: THE DREAMING CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ABORIGINAL
AUSTRALIANS (2002).
21
See Jeremy Beckette, Aboriginal Histories, Aboriginal Myths: An Introduction, 65 OCEANIA 97
(1994); Alan Rumsey, The Dreaming, Human Agency and Inscriptive Practice, 65 OCEANIA 116 (1994).
22
See, e.g., IAN KEEN, KNOWLEDGE AND SECRECY IN AN ABORIGINAL RELIGION 211 (1994).
23
See JENNIFER ISAACS, AUSTRALIAN DREAMING: 40,000 YEARS OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY (1980);
Deborah Bird Rose, Consciousness and Responsibility in an Australian Aboriginal Religion, in WILLIAM H.
MORPHY, TRADITIONAL ABORIGINAL SOCIETY: A READER 257–69 (Macmillan ed. Melbourne, 1987);
Morphy, supra note 18; KEEN, supra note 22; FRANCOISE DUSSART, THE POLITICS OF RITUAL IN AN
ABORIGINAL SETTLEMENT: KINSHIP, GENDER, AND THE CURRENCY OF KNOWLEDGE (2000).
24
Also spelled: Wonjina, Wanjina and Ounjina.
25
Principally the Mowanjum, Ngarinyin, Worrorra, and Wunambal peoples of the north-western and
central Kimberley.
26
The Kimberley is an area of 423,517 square kilometers (163,521 square miles) in Northwestern
Australia.
27
See the authorities referred to in CHRISTOPH B. GRABER, WANJINA AND WUNGGURR: THE
PROPERTISATION OF ABORIGINAL ROCK ART UNDER AUSTRALIAN LAW, in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ.
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 275-297 (Caliess Gralf-Peter et al. eds.,
2009).
28
See I.M. Crawford, The Art of the Wandjina: Aboriginal Cave Paintings in Kimberley, Western
Australia, 74 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 118 (1972); Charles P. Mountford, The Art of the Wandjina:
Aboriginal Cave Paintings in Kimberley, Western Australia, 5 MAN 160; THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ART: A
REFLECTION ON ITS HISTORY & CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE (Morphy et al. eds., 2005).
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Wandjina painted images of themselves in caves and rock shelters
throughout the Kimberley region,29 located adjacent to where the Wandjina
chose to die. Wandjina are painted as full-length, or simply head and
shoulder, figures with large mouthless faces with enormous black eyes
flanking a beak-like nose.30 In some places, the Wandjina is painted as an
animal such as a crocodile, which are endemic to the region.31 The absence
of a mouth represents the idea that Wandjina are so powerful that they do
not require speech. If a mouth was to appear on a Wandjina image, this
would portend floods and cyclones.32 A band usually surrounds the head of
the Wandjina with outward radiating lines, signifying the feathers that the
Wandjinas wore and the lightning that they control.33
Today, certain Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples repaint the images in
tribal ceremonies in December and January to ensure the continuity of the
Wandjina’s presence and also to ensure the arrival of the monsoon rains.34
In addition to its spiritual significance, these repainted images have the
practical effect of identifying the continual connection of Aboriginal Peoples
with their tribal lands which is significant in Australian Native Title claims.
A Native Title claim may be made under the Federal Native Title Act 1993
whereby Aboriginal Peoples can assert rights of access, enjoyment and the
protection of places of spiritual and cultural significance in relation to lands
which others may wish to use for mining, pastoral, or other commercial
purposes.35 For example, in Neowarra v State of Western Australia,36 the
Native Title Tribunal had to consider the Native Title claims of peoples of
the Ngarinyin, Wunambal and Worrorra language groups over more than
29
See Nancy D. Munn, 74 AM. ANTHROPOLOGISTS 118 (1972) (reviewing Crawford, supra note 28);
Ian J. McNiven & Lynette Russell, ‘Strange Paintings’ and ‘Mystery Races:’ Kimberley Rock-Art,
Diffusionism and Colonialist Constructions of Australia's Aboriginal Past, 71 ANTIQUITY, 801, 809 (1997);
JOSEPHINE FLOOD, ROCK ART OF THE DREAMTIME (Angus and Robertson eds., 1997).
30
See Crawford, supra note 28.
31
Id.
32
See JOSEPHINE FLOOD, ROCK ART OF THE DREAMTIME 32 (1997); Wandjina, ABORIGINAL ART
NEWS, NOV. 23, 2001, available at http://news.aboriginalartdirectory.com/2001/11/wandjina.php.
33
See W. Arndt, The Australian Evolution of the Wandjinas from Rainclouds, 34 OCEANIA 161
(1964); Valda Blundell, The Art of Country: Aesthetics, Place, and Aboriginal Identity in North-West
Australia, in DAVID S. TRIGGER & GARETH GRIFFITHS, DISPUTED TERRITORIES: LAND, CULTURE AND
IDENTITY IN SETTLER SOCIETIES 155–85 (2003).
34
See David Mowaljarlai & C. Peck, Ngarinyin, Cultural Continuity: A Project to Teach the Young
People Our Culture, 2 AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL 71 (1987); Graeme Ward, Ochre and Acrylic: Conflicting
Ideologies and Divergent Discourses in the Issue of Repainting of Aboriginal Imagery, in RETOUCH:
MAINTENANCE AND CONSERVATION OF ABORIGINAL ROCK IMAGERY, PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM O,
RETOUCH: AN OPTION TO CONSERVATION? AUSTRALIAN ROCK ART RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 5 (Graeme
Ward ed., 1992); Sandra Bowdler, Repainting Australian Rock Art, 62 ANTIQUITY 517 (1988).
35
See UNSETTLING ANTHROPOLOGY: THE DEMANDS OF NATIVE TITLE ON WORN CONCEPTS AND
CHANGING LIVES (Toni Bauman & Gaynro Mcdonald eds., 2011).
36
[2003] FCA 1402 (Austl.).
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100,000 square kilometres against the State of Western Australia, the West
Australian Fishing Industry Council and against a number of pastoral lessees,
bauxite miners and a telecommunications company. 37 The claimants
asserted that their peoples had occupied the region for as long as 26,000
years. 38 They gathered evidence about the spiritual association of these
peoples with their Wandjina creators, and they explained their practice of
renewing the paint on the Wandjina images within their respective tribal
areas.39 A 1997 study found that there were often thirty to fifty layers of
paint on Wandjina images. 40 A recent review of rock art dating in the
Kimberley region provides a range of dates commencing from between
33,000 and 42,000 years ago.41
Evidence indicated that the Wandjina was a central feature of the
belief systems of the tribes of the region. One witness explained:
[W]e . . . represent Wanjina we are all Wanjina tribe and we
tell the story what happened, the story from his time and he left
us to look after this country because we are his people, we are
his servants to look after and we look after him. . . . He talk for
us, we talk for him. All the same, that's what we are here for in
this land.42
The opponents of the Native Title claim pointed to the lack of uniformity of
practice of the three tribes in relation to the laws and customs concerning
Wandjina history, tradition and meaning.43 The Tribunal accepted that from
the mosaic of the Aboriginal evidence, which was delivered with differing
degrees of proficiency in English, that “Wandjina created the land and
waters and what lives on or in them, and laid down laws and customs around
which the Aboriginal people have constructed their lives. The evidence
discloses the continued prominence of Wandjina beliefs.”44
37

Id. at para. 10.
Id. at para. 11.
39
See, e.g., id. at para. 277-85; see also Martin Porr & Hannah Rachel Bell, ‘Rock-Art’, ‘Animism’
and Two-Way Thinking: Towards a Complementary Epistemology in the Understanding of Material
Culture and ‘Rock-art’ of Hunting and Gathering People, 19 J. OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD & THEORY
161 (2012).
40
Neowarra, FCA 1402, at para. 282, referencing A. Watchman, Dating the Kimberley Rock
Paintings, in KEVIN FRANCIS KENNEALLY, MIKE DONALDSON, KIMBERLEY SOCIETY, ET AL.,
ABORIGINAL ROCK ART OF THE KIMBERLEY 39-45 (1997)).
41
See Jane Balme, Excavation Revealing 40,000 Years of Occupation at Mimbi Caves, South
Central Kimberley, Western Australia, 51 AUSTRALIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 1 (2000); Maxine Aubert, A Review
of Rock Art Dating in the Kimberley, Western Australia, 39 J. OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL SCI. 573–77 (2012).
42
Id. at para. 168.
43
Id. at paras. 154-59.
44
Id. at para. 177.
38
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In Neowarra, the Tribunal explained that each tribe had the sacred
obligation to repaint and maintain the Wandjina images within their
territories.45 For the purposes of the Native Title claim, these practices were
accepted as part of the matrix of evidence which connected the three tribes
to the land which was the subject of the claim.46
This article examines the extent to which the spiritual beliefs of
Aboriginal Peoples are protected under Australian law.
B.

Misuse of Wandjina Images

It has been suggested that sacred images such as the Wandjina
perform the same function for Aboriginal Peoples as do images of Christ and
the Holy Trinity for Christianity.47 However, the denigration of Christian
belief is sanctioned by the common law offense of blasphemy,48 whereas
non-deistic beliefs do not appear to fall within this protection. For example
the colonies of Connecticut, 49 Delaware, 50 Maine, 51 Massachusetts, 52
Maryland, 53 and Pennsylvania 54 had laws which criminalized blasphemy
which remained in place after the formation of the United States of
America. 55 In each statute the offense was defined by reference to
Christianity. Thus, in The State v. Chandler, 56 the Supreme Court of
Delaware pointed out that “it appears to have been long perfectly settled by
the common law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious
and wanton attack against the Christian religion individually, for the purpose
of exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indictable and
punishable as a temporal offense.”57 Although the United States Supreme
45
Id. at paras. 277-85. See also David Mowaljarlai, et al., Repainting of Images on Rock in
Australia and the Maintenance of Aboriginal Culture, 67 ANTIQUITY 690 (1988).
46
Id. at paras. 379-83.
47
See Glenn Pilkington, The Wandjina Spirit: From Rock to Wall, available at
http://www.artsource.net.au/as_downloads/newsletter/Summer2006.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
48
See DAVID LAWTON, BLASPHEMY ch. 1 (1993).
49
JOHN B. DILLON, ODDITIES OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION IN AMERICA AS APPLIED TO THE PUBLIC
LANDS, PRIMITIVE EDUCATION, RELIGION, MORALS, INDIANS, ETC. 39 (1879) available at
http://www.unz.org/Pub/DillonJohn-1879.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 31, 33.
53
Id. at 30-31.
54
Id. at 36.
55
The country’s first blasphemy case, People v. Ruggles Johson, 8 Johns 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811),
involved offensive words denigrating Jesus Christ and his mother.
56
1 Del. (1 Harr.) 553 (1837).
57
Similarly, see the decisions of the Supreme Court the State of Pennsylvania in 1824 in Updegraph
v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawl 394 (Pa. 1824) and in Zeisweiss v. James, et al., 63 Pa. State Rep. 465
(1870); and of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Mass. (1
Pick.) 206 (1838).
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Court in the 1952 case Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,58 held that the New
York State blasphemy law was an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom
of speech as it was “…not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine…,”59
the Supreme Court of Maine in the 1921 case State v. Mockus60 had held it
to be a breach of public peace by word or deed to “expose the God of the
Christian religion, or the Holy Scriptures, “to contempt and ridicule” or to
“rob official oaths of any of their sanctity, thus undermining the foundations
of their binding force.”61
The potential issue of blasphemy in an indigenous Australian context
arose in 2007 when street graffiti depictions of Wandjina appeared in Perth,
the State capital of Western Australia.62 This caused some consternation to
the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples, who were concerned about the
unauthorized depictions of Wandjina Spirit.63 They pointed out the sacred
significance of the Wandjina for its traditional custodians, but the Christian
context of the offense of blasphemy dissuaded litigation of this issue.64 It
should also be mentioned that even the common law action has been
abolished as anachronistic in many common law jurisdictions.65
As will be seen below, it has been suggested that IP law is a better
vehicle for dealing with the protection of the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. However, in 1995 the National
Indigenous Arts Advocacy Association, Inc. (“NIAAA”) reported the
unauthorized use of the Wandjina spirit as a logo for a surfboard company.66
Analyzing the problem as an intellectual property issue, the NIAAA pointed
out that authorship was impossible to resolve as it is believed that the
paintings were done by the Wandjina themselves. Of course, even if

58

343 U.S. 495 (1952).
Id. at 505.
60
113 A. 39; 120 Me. 84 (1921).
61
Id. at 41.
62
Paige Taylor, ‘Wandering Wandjinas' Mystery, SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/western-australia/wandering-wandjinas-mystery/story-e6frg13u1111112784667.
63
See Who Paintin’ Dis Wadjina?, a movie produced by Taryne Laffar (Australia 2007) which
examines the impact of hundreds of spray-painted images of Wandjinas in Perth and surrounds, available
at http://www.creativespirits.info/resources/movies/who-paintin-dis-wandjina#ixzz2JdgOCeap.
64
See Pilkington, supra note 47.
65
See Jeremy Patrick, The Curious Persistence of Blasphemy, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 187 (2011).
66
NATIONAL INDIGENOUS ARTS ADVOCACY ASSOCIATION, STOPPING THE RIP-OFFS INQUIRY 5
(1995).
59
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authorship could be resolved, the antiquity of these images also means that
they are outside the length of copyright protection.67
III.

PROHIBITION OF RACIAL VILIFICATION

The unauthorized use of the sacred images of Aboriginal Peoples could
possibly be challenged on the basis that it constitutes actionable racial
vilification. However, complaints relying on the Federal Racial Hatred Act
1995 illustrate the limitations of this legislation in protecting the sacred
beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. The Act inserted a
new part into the Australian Racial Discrimination Act 1975 after concerns
about racist violence and harassment directed against indigenous peoples.68
Section 18C(1) provides that it is unlawful for a person to do an act,
otherwise than in private, if:
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to
offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a
group of people; and
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or
ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the
people in the group.
Exempted from proscription by Section 18D is anything said or done
“reasonably and in good faith”:
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic
work; or
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or
debate made or held for any genuine academic, artistic or
scientific purpose or any other genuine purpose in the public
interest; or
(c) in making or publishing:
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public
interest; or
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if
the comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the
person making the comment.
67
See Michael Blakeney, Protecting Cultural Expressions of Indigenous Peoples: The Australian
Perspective, 89 COPYRIGHT WORLD 1, 5-7 (1999).
68
The Explanatory Memorandum, Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) stated that the legislation sought to
address concerns highlighted by the findings of the HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO RACIST VIOLENCE 387 (1991), which found that
racist violence against Indigenous people was an 'endemic' problem in Australia 387; see also N. Poynder,
Racial Vilification Legislation, 71 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 4 (1994).
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Section 18C has been criticized because “its key words and phrases are
sufficiently imprecise in both their definition and application as to make the
putative legal standards they embody largely devoid of any core and
ascertainable content.” 69 Practically, it is difficult to show that the
unauthorized use of Aboriginal spiritual images is an act done “because of
the race . . . of the other person.”70 The words “offend” and “insult” are also
vague. And, with the possible exception of cases involving extreme racist
conduct, the ambiguity of the section is such that “too many determinations
could comfortably and justifiably have been decided the other way.”71 So
far, the case law has been inconclusive.72
Corunna v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd., 73 which concerned an
application brought by an Aboriginal elder on behalf of a number of
Nyungar elders, highlights the challenge of interpreting the Racial Hatred
Act’s reasonableness standard. The Nyungar are the Aboriginal People of
the Perth region. The case involved the publication of a cartoon in the West
Australian newspaper which arose from attempts of elders to retrieve the
head of an ancestral warrior, Yagan, from the Liverpool Infirmary in
England. 74 The cartoon was allegedly demeaning of Nyungar people,
particularly in relation to their Dreamtime ancestor Waugyl. The applicant
argued that this conduct ought to be judged under Section 18C(l)(a)
according to whether the cartoon was reasonably likely to offend a person
who was an Aboriginal person of the Nyungar group, even though it may not
have offended a reasonable non-Aboriginal person. The respondent argued
against the adoption of a reasonable Aboriginal or Nyungar standard and
submitted that a “reasonable ordinary reader” of the newspaper was the
correct standard by which to judge the offensiveness of the conduct. The
Commissioner agreed with the applicant that the appropriate question was
whether a “reasonable Nyungar or Aboriginal person” would, in all the
circumstances, be offended by the cartoon.75
69
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However, the Commissioner ultimately dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the respondent could rely upon the exception in Section 18D,
ruling that the newspaper had acted “reasonably and in good faith” in
publishing the cartoon, finding that testing the cartoon against “moral and
ethical consideration, expressive of community standards,” it did not act
outside the “margin of tolerance” allowed under Section 18D. 76 The
Commissioner concluded that while it may be argued that the cartoon could
be characterized as “exaggerated” or “prejudiced,” it was not sufficiently
exaggerated or “prejudiced (having regard to the surrounding circumstances)
to breach the standard of reasonableness.”77 This case has been dismissed as
an example of the “reification of dominant racial values” which prioritizes
“non-indigenous racial narratives over Indigenous perspectives.” 78 The best
that can be said for this case is that it emphasized the looseness of the
reasonableness standard.
In contrast, the Commissioner in Mingli Wanjurri and Others v.
Southern Cross Broadcasting Ltd. and Howard Sattler 79 sustained the
complaints, finding a breach of Section 18C. 80 This case concerned a
program on the radio station 6PR (owned by the media chain Southern
Cross) hosted by the controversial announcer, Howard Sattler. 81 Two
persons described as taxi drivers made statements claimed to be derogatory
of Nyungar culture and beliefs. The broadcast referred to Nyungar protests
about the re-development of a brewery site, recognized by Nyungars as
Goonininup, the resting place of the Waugal or Rainbow Serpent. The
Rainbow Serpent plays an important role in the belief systems of a number
of Australian Aboriginal Peoples, particularly in relation to the creation of
waterholes and other resources.82
The same Commissioner, who ruled against the Nyungar in the
Corunna case, determined here that there was a breach of Section 18C.
Among his findings were that the broadcast suggested among other things
that:
 Nyungar people lie about the existence of religious sites;
76
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 The Waugyl should have been killed with a shovel;
 Nyungar religious sites are deserving of the same level of respect as a
place where a person had his first sexual experience;
 Nyungar people engaged in urinating, defecating and fornicating in a
manner disrespectful of the site’s religious significance.
The Commissioner ruled that the “derogatory comments about significant
religious figures” could not be exempted and showed a “culpably reckless
and callous indifference toward the Nyungar people.”83 The Commissioner
noted that the Nyungar Elders continued to be very hurt and upset by the
derogatory and insulting broadcast, which related to religious and cultural
matters of great significance to them.84 They referred to the public nature of
the comments and the fact that they were made to many thousands of
listeners. In light of these circumstances it was determined that an
appropriate award was $10,000 Australian Dollars (“AUD”) for each
complainant, a total amount of $50,000 AUD.
The Corunna and Wanjurri cases demonstrate the possibilities and
limits of the racial vilification law. Whether the culturally inappropriate,
demeaning, or even unauthorized use of the sacred symbols of Aboriginal
Peoples can form the basis of a successful complaint under this legislation
remains to be seen.
IV.

CULTURALLY INAPPROPRIATE USE OF SACRED IMAGES

One arena in which the sacred beliefs of Aboriginal Peoples have been
protected is in relation to land planning. In Tenodi v Blue Mountains City
Council,85 the New South Wales Land and Environment Court considered
the unauthorized and inappropriate use of a Wandjina image in an eight-foot
sculpture “Wandjina Watchers in Whispering Stone,” erected by the
proprietor of a “wellness spa” in a town on the east coast of Australia, some
2500 miles from the Kimberley. 86 It transpired that no environmental
planning permission had been obtained for the sculpture under the local land
planning laws. Objectors included representatives from both the indigenous
and non-indigenous community. Evidence was provided by the objectors
about Wandjina’s important role in the indigenous culture of the Worrorra,
Ngarinyin and the Wunambal in the Kimberley for whom “the Wandjina is
83
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supreme creator, the maker of earth and all upon it. Wandjina brought law
that governs marriage relationships to people and land.”87 They explained
that “Wandjina imagery is sacred; it cannot be used by them if it has not
been approved.”88 Specifically, it was pointed out that:
 the applicant is not from their language group and did not
obtain permission to use the imagery;
 the depiction of the Wandjina imagery incorporates
mouths and the Wandjina is never depicted in this way
(this depiction is particularly offensive to them);
 the applicant was using Wandjina imagery for
commercial purposes and thereby abusing their
indigenous culture for private gain;
 the Blue Mountains Region has its own creational
ancestral beings and local Aboriginal groups find it
inappropriate to bring these images and interpretation of
these images to their country without permission.89
The local Gundungurra and Durug people of the Blue Mountains area, who
supported the position taken by the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples, also
found the unauthorized use of the Wandjina imagery to be highly
offensive.90
The Land and Environment Court ruled that the failure of the sculptor
to obtain the permission of the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples was not a
matter which fell within the land planning legislation; instead, the prominent
location of the sculpture and its public visibility meant that it would offend
the “affected community.”91 This would presumably be the community of
the Blue Mountains area, rather than the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ABORIGINAL SPIRITUAL BELIEFS

V.

AS A

MEANS

OF

PROTECTION

OF

In Australia, the most claims to protect the sacred beliefs of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples have been brought in IP law.
The first of the IP cases was Foster v Mountford, 92 which concerned an
anthropology text Nomads of the Desert, written to document the life of the
Pitjantjatjara People of the South Australian desert and which reproduced
87
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images which were forbidden to uninitiated members of the Pitjantjatjara.93
The court in this case was prepared to grant an injunction to prevent the
book’s distribution in the Northern Territory because the author had been
shown these sacred matters in confidence.94 The problem with breach of
confidence as a basis for protecting sacred beliefs is that some confidential
communication has to be established. Preventing the unauthorized use of
information or paintings and other artifacts in the public domain has to rely
on some other field of IP protection. In most cases, this has been copyright
law.
The earliest documented example in this regard concerned a graphic
design used by the Reserve Bank of Australia which was used on Australia’s
first decimal currency one dollar note which was introduced in 1967. The
design was based on a painting by David Malangi of a Gurrmirringu
mortuary feast. 95 An allegation of copyright infringement was made on
behalf of the artist and on legal advice Dr. H. C. Coombs, the Governor of
the Reserve Bank, provided the artist with $1000, a gift and a medallion as
compensation and reward. An Aboriginal commentator explained that this
case was important for publicly fixing “the idea of the Aboriginal painter as
an individually recognised art practitioner.”96 The sacred significance of the
unauthorized reproduction was not canvassed in this case.
The Reserve Bank of Australia was also involved in Yumbulul v.
Reserve Bank of Australia97 which concerned its issuance of a $10 banknote
to commemorate the 1988 bicentennial of white settlement in Australia. The
banknote, reproduced the design of a Morning Star Pole created by Terry
Yumbulul, a Yolgnu artist.98 Evidence was presented which established that
Morning Star Poles had a central role in Yolgnu l ceremonies
commemorating the deaths of important persons and in inter-clan
relationships. The particular pole created by Mr. Yumbulul was carved from
cotton wood and surmounted with a crown of lorikeet and white cockatoo
93
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feathers, representing the rays of the Morning Star. Painted on the pole was
a design representing the yam spirit man who would climb up the pole
carrying the spirit of a deceased person to the Morning Star. The Court
found the pole to be an original artistic work of Mr. Yumbulul, within the
meaning of the Copyright Act. Furthermore, the Court found the artist’s
copyright in the artifact to have been validly assigned. This finding was
sufficient to resolve the claim for breach of copyright.99
A novel aspect of this case was that Galpu Clan, of which Terry
Yumbulul was a member, jealously guarded the right of a person to make a
Morning Star Pole. Mr. Yumbulul had passed through various levels of
initiation and revelatory ceremonies in which he learned the Clan’s sacred
designs and their meanings. During the last initiation rite in which he
participated, Mr. Yumbulul was presented with sacred objects, conferring
his authority to paint the sacred objects of his people. Following the
depiction of Mr. Yumbulul’s Morning Star Pole on the commemorative
banknote, Mr. Yumbulul was criticized by his people who argued that he
had a cultural obligation to their clan to ensure that a pole was not used or
reproduced in any way which was offensive in their eyes. 100 Mr.
Yumbulul’s attempt to set aside the assignment of his copyright in the pole
on the ground of unconscionability was unsuccessful. In any event, the
assignee could have relied upon a special statutory defense to a copyright
infringement action. The trial judge acknowledged that it may be the case
that “Australia’s copyright law does not provide adequate recognition of
Aboriginal community claims to regulate the reproduction and use of works
which are essentially communal in origin.”101 He concluded by suggesting
that “the question of statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal interests
in the reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration by law
reformers and legislators.” 102 More than twenty years after this case,
appropriate legislation addressing Aboriginal interests in protecting sacred
works still has not been enacted.
The first post-Mabo consideration of copyright law to assimilate
Aboriginal concerns about the unauthorized reproduction of sacred
Aboriginal images was the Australian Federal Court decision in Milpurrurru
and Others v. Indofurn Party Ltd. & Others 103 which concerned the
importation into Australia of a number of carpets woven in Vietnam which
99
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incorporated Aboriginal designs.
The applicants were three living
Aboriginal artists and the Public Trustee claiming on behalf of the estates of
five deceased Aboriginal artists. Each of the artists in question had works
that were either reproduced in portfolios of Aboriginal art produced for the
Australian National Gallery (“ANG”) or in portfolios published by the
Australian Government Printer for the Australian Information Service
(“AIS”). The first four artists were leading exponents of bark paintings
illustrating the beliefs of the Aboriginal Peoples of Central Australia. It was
agreed that, among the carpets which were the subject of the action, seven of
the eight artworks were reproduced in virtually identical form and color.
The final artwork, it was held, was substantially reproduced, albeit in a more
simplified form. Evidence was tendered that reproductions of their works
were permitted by Aboriginal artists in prestigious publications like the
ANG portfolio and the AIS publication, which were designed for the
education of members of the white community about Aboriginal culture. In
each of the ANG and AIS publications the descriptions of the works made it
clear that the subject matter of the works concerned stories of spiritual and
sacred significance to the artist. It was additionally submitted that painting
techniques and the use of totemic and other images and symbols were in
many instances and invariably in the case of important creation stories,
strictly controlled by Aboriginal law and custom. It was explained that the
right to create paintings and other artworks depicting creation and dreaming
stories and to use pre-existing designs and clan totems resided in the
traditional custodians of the stories. Because artworks are an important
means of recording these stories, it was pointed out that errors in
reproduction could cause deep offense.104
While Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia established that there
are no communal rights to copyright, Milpurrurru v. Indofurn considered
whether damages could be awarded to a plaintiff because of spiritual harm
suffered by the plaintiff and by members of the tribe or clan group due to the
wrongful use of sacred images.
Ms. Banduk Marika first raised this question in her depiction of the
story related to a site on her clan (Rirratjingu) land, at Port Bradshaw south
of Yirrkala in the Northern Territory of Australia, “where our creation
ancestors, the Djangkawu, visited on their journey across Arnhem Land.”105
She explained further that:
104
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When the Djangkawu handed over this land to the Rirratjingu
they did so on the condition that we continued to perform the
ceremonies, produce the paintings and the ceremonial objects
that commemorate their acts and journeys. . . . The place,
Yalangbara, and the particular story of the Djangkawu
associated with it do not exist in isolation. They are part of a
complex or “dreaming track” stretching from the sea off the
east coast of Arnhem Land through Yalangbara, across the land
to the west of Ramingining and Milingimbi.106
Her right to use this imagery arose out of her membership of the
Yolgnu Clan, the traditional custodians of the Arnhem Land region of the
Northern Territory region. She explained by affidavit that “as an artist,
whilst I may own the copyright in a particular artwork under Western law,
under Aboriginal law I must not use an image or story in such a way as to
undermine the rights of all the other Yolngu.”107 She submitted that the
reproduction of the artwork in circumstances where the dreaming would be
walked on was totally opposed to the cultural use of the imagery in her
artwork. She explained that the misuse of her artwork had caused her great
concern and that if it had come to the attention of her family she could have
been subject to a catalog of sanctions ranging from being outcast to a
prohibition against further artistic production.
Having found an
infringement in the copyright of Ms. Marika’s works, in quantifying her
damages the Court took into account the potential sanctions to which she
may have been subject by her people. No damages could be awarded to any
of the deceased artists in relation to the harm suffered by their people. The
Judge explained that “statutory remedies do not recognize the infringement
of ownership rights of the kind which reside under Aboriginal law in the
traditional owners of the dreaming stories and the imagery such as that used
in the artworks of the present applicants.”108
The issue of the communal rights of Aboriginal Peoples in relation to
the harm done to their spiritual beliefs in a copyright infringement context
was raised in John Bulun Bulun & Anor v. R & T Textiles Party Ltd.109 This
case arose out of the importation and sale in Australia of printed clothing
fabric which infringed the copyright of the Aboriginal artist, Mr. John Bulun
Bulun, in his work Magpie Geese and Water Lillies at the Waterhole. Mr.
Bulun Bulun and Mr. George Milipurrurru, both members of the Ganalbingu
106
107
108
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people, initiated the proceedings. Ganalbingu country is situated in Arnhem
Land in the Northern Territory of Australia. Mr. Bulun Bulun sued as legal
owner of the copyright in the painting and sought remedies for infringement
under the Australian Copyright Act 1968. Mr. Milpurrurru brought the
proceedings in his own name and as a representative of the Ganalbingu
claiming that they were the equitable owners of the copyright subsisting in
the painting.110
Mr. Milpurrurru’s painting depicted the waterhole Djulibinyamurr, the
place from which Barnda, the long-necked turtle creator ancestor of the
Ganalbingu people, had emerged. Mr. Bulun Bulun’s affidavit explained
that his ancestors were granted responsibility by Barnda to maintain and
preserve all of the Mayardin (corpus of ritual knowledge) associated with the
Ganalbingu land. Part of the artist’s responsibility as “Djungayi” or
manager of the Mayardin, was to create paintings in accordance with the
laws and rituals of the Ganalbingu people. He claimed that the unauthorized
reproduction “threatens the whole system and ways that underpin the
stability and continuance of [the artist’s] society. It interferes with the
relationship between people, their creator ancestors, and the land given to
the people by their creator ancestor.” Mr. Bulun Bulun explained that all of
the traditional owners of the Ganalbingu land would have to agree on any
exploitation of art works depicting sacred sites, such as the waterhole.111
The claim for copyright infringement was accepted by the respondents,
and Mr. Milpurrurru’s representative action questioned whether the
communal interests of traditional Aboriginal owners in cultural artworks,
recognized under Aboriginal law, created binding legal or equitable
obligations on persons outside the relevant Aboriginal community. The
assertion by the Ganalbingu of rights in equity depended upon there being a
trust impressed on expressions of ritual knowledge, such as the Magpie
Geese and Water Lillies at the Waterhole. The Court acknowledged that
among African tribal communities, tribal property was regarded as being
held on trust by the customary head of a tribal group. However, the court
here found no evidence of an express or implied trust created in respect of
Mr. Bulun Bulun’s art. This was an issue of intention and the court found no
evidence of any practice among the Ganalbingu whereby artworks were held
in trust.
In an extensive obiter dictum in this test case, the Court found the
subsistence of a fiduciary relationship between Mr. Bulun Bulun and the
Ganalbingu people. This relationship was said to arise from the trust and
110
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confidence by his people that his artistic creativity would be exercised to
preserve the integrity of the law, custom, culture, and ritual knowledge of
the Ganalbingu. The court concluded that this finding did not treat the law
and custom of the Ganalbingu as part of the Australian legal system, rather it
treated these matters as part of the factual matrix, characterizing the
relationship as one of mutual trust and confidence from which fiduciary
obligations arose. Thus, Mr. Bulun Bulun’s fiduciary obligation was “not to
exploit the artistic work in such a way that is contrary to the laws and
custom of the Ganalbingu people, and, in the event of infringement by a
third party, to take reasonable and appropriate action to restrain and remedy
infringement of the copyright in the artistic work.”112
However, in dismissing the representative action of Mr. Milpurrurru
against the respondents, the court ruled that the rights of the Ganalbingu
were confined to a right in personam against Mr. Bulun Bulun to enforce his
copyright in works against third party infringers. Here, because Mr. Bulun
Bulun had successfully enforced his copyright, there was no need for the
intervention of equity to provide any additional remedy to the beneficiaries
of the fiduciary relationship. The Court speculated that had Mr. Bulun
Bulun failed to take action to enforce his copyright, the beneficiaries might
have been able to sue the infringer in their own names.113
VI.

REFORM OF AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
THE SPIRITUAL BELIEFS OF ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

TO

PROTECT

Perceived inadequacies in IP law as a vehicle for the protection of the
spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples have
prompted a number of suggestions for the modification of that law.114 In a
1994 Issues Paper, Stopping the Rip-Offs: Intellectual Property Protection
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, the Commonwealth
Attorney-General’s Department analyzed the limitations of the current
Australian IP regime in protecting the intellectual property rights of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. This paper identified several
112
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possible approaches to improve the situation, including amendments to the
Copyright Act, 1968, which would require a mark to authenticate Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander creations and special legislation. The Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (“ATSIC”) conducted consultations
seeking the views of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples on the
form and content of any proposed legislation. 115 In early 1996, ATSIC
established an Indigenous Reference Group to manage the consultations.116
In June 1996, it commissioned the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Studies (“AIATSIS”) to manage the consultations. A
report produced by the consultants in June 1997 addressed methods for
protecting indigenous knowledge under the patents and copyright systems.117
The Moral Rights Act 2000 amended the Australian Copyright Act
1968 to include the protection of the moral rights of attribution and the right
to not have a work treated in a derogatory manner. In 2001, the Coalition
Federal Government, in its arts policy for the general election of that year,
promised that amendments to this moral rights regime would “give
Indigenous communities a means to prevent unauthorized and derogatory
treatment of works that embody community images or knowledge.”118 On
July 23, 2001, the Government announced an independent inquiry (“Myer
Review”) into the contemporary visual arts and craft sector to recommend
actions for governments and the sector to enhance their future. 119 The
inquiry found that the communal rights of Aboriginal Peoples were ignored
in the current moral rights law and that “the right to integrity and prohibition
of derogatory treatment of an artistic work embodying traditional ritual
knowledge should be extended to include a treatment that causes cultural
harm to the clan,” and that there should be amending legislation. 120 In
December 2003, a draft Copyright Amendment (Indigenous Communal
Moral Rights) bill 2003 was distributed for comment to a number of
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organizations.121 The bill was criticized for its complexity and the ambiguity
of its language122 and, in February 2006, it was announced that a revised
version of the bill would be made available later that year.123 But, this bill
languished, and in 2006, the 215-page Copyright Amendment Act 2006 was
enacted to give effect to the copyright provisions of the Australia–United
States Free Trade Agreement of 2004.124 In 2007, a change of government
took place. While in opposition, the current Labor government indicated
that it would consider implementing the recommendations of the Myer
Review.125 Yet, to date there have been no such developments.126
VII. INDIGENOUS CULTURAL PROTOCOLS
In the absence of legislation Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples have promulgated cultural protocols to prescribe appropriate
dealings with their cultural artifacts.127 Although not legally binding, the
protocols are important in raising the profile of indigenous peoples sacred
beliefs in a cultural context. 128 Additionally, compliance with these
protocols is made a precondition for university ethics clearance and for
public funding.129
VIII. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ DECLARATIONS
Frustrated at the lengthy delay in the formulation of both national and
international standards for the protection of the IP rights of indigenous
peoples, a number of indigenous peoples have taken it upon themselves to
formulate those rights. A significant initiative during the UN International
121
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Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples was a Conference on Cultural and
Intellectual Property held on Kuku Yalanji Aboriginal land in the Daintree
Forest area of Far North Queensland in November 1993 which adopted the
Julayinbul Statement on Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights. 130 The
Julayinbul Statement affirmed the unique spiritual and cultural relationship
of Indigenous Peoples with the Earth which determined their perceptions of
intellectual property. The Statement asserted that “Aboriginal intellectual
property, within Aboriginal Common Law, is an inherent inalienable right
which cannot be terminated, extinguished or taken.” The Statement called
on governments to review legislation and non-statutory policies that did not
recognize indigenous intellectual property rights and to implement such
international conventions that do recognize these rights. The Conference
also issued a Declaration Reaffirming the Self Determination and
Intellectual Property Rights of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the
Wet Tropics Rainforest Area. This Declaration was primarily concerned
with bioprospecting and the intellectual property rights of indigenous
peoples to traditional knowledge.
The Julayinbul Statement was one of a number of similar declarations
issued by Indigenous Peoples. These included the Mataatua Declaration on
the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples issued
by the Nine Tribes of Mataatua in the Bay of Plenty Region of Aotearoa,
New Zealand in June 1993.131 The Mataatua Declaration recommended in
Article 1 that in the development of policies and practices, indigenous
peoples should “define for themselves their own intellectual and cultural
property and it noted that “existing protection mechanisms are insufficient
for the protection of Indigenous Peoples Intellectual and Cultural Property
Rights.” The Mataatua Declaration in Article 2.1 recommended that in the
development of policies and practices, States and national and international
agencies "should recognize that indigenous peoples are the guardians of their
customary knowledge and have the right to protect and control
dissemination of that knowledge.” A number of similar declarations were
issued by groups of Indigenous Peoples in Asia,132 the Pacific,133 Africa,134
and Central135 and South America.136
130
Reproduced in Aboriginal Intellectual and Cultural Property, Conference Proceedings 25-27
(Queensland Rainforest Aboriginal Network, Jimgarra, Nov. 1993).
131
THE NINE TRIBES OF MATAATUA IN THE BAY OF PLENTY REGION AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND, THE
MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
(N.Z. 1992), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/indigenous/link0002.html.
132
Tambunan Statement on the Protection and Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge, February
(1995) (Malay.).
133
Suva Statement on Indigenous Peoples Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights, (1995) (Fiji).
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The culmination of this declaratory activism was the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”), adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 13, 2007.137 143
member states voted in favor of UNDRIP as a non-binding text which sets
out the rights of indigenous peoples to “maintain and strengthen their own
institutions, cultures and traditions, and to pursue their development in
keeping with their own needs and aspirations.”138 Relevant to the protection
of the spiritual beliefs of indigenous peoples is Article 11(2) which requires
that “States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms,
…developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their …
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed
consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs” and Article 12
which recognized the right of indigenous peoples to “. . . maintain, protect
and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures,
such as ...artefacts, designs, ceremonies, . . . and literature . . . .”
Article 31 of UNDRIP recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to
maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over their
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.
Four UN Member States (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the
United States) voted against the Resolution adopting UNDRIP and eleven
countries abstained. Senator Marise Payne explained the various reasons for
the Australian Government’s opposition to the Declaration. She pointed out
that “as our laws here currently stand, we protect our Indigenous cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expression to an
extent that is consistent with both Australian and international intellectual
property law, and we are not prepared to go as far as the provisions in the
text of the draft declaration currently do on that matter.”139 In other words,
Senator Payne seemed to indicate that the Australian Government was
opposed to any sui generis protection of traditional knowledge. She also
indicated the Australian Government’s opposition to “the inclusion in the
text of an unqualified right of free, prior and informed consent for
134
INTERNATIONAL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT KHOI-SAN
TERRITORY, KIMBERLY DECLARATION (2002).
135
Santa Cruz de la Sierra Statement on Intellectual Property, (1994) (Bol.).
136
THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ON TERRITORY, ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, KARI-OCA DECLARATION (1992), available at http://www.ipcb.org/resolutions/
htmls/karioca.html.
137
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.S. GAOR, 61st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/61/53 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_
en.pdf.
138
Id. at Preamble.
139
CTH. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, Senate 53 (Sept. 10, 2007) (Marise Payne, Senator).
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indigenous peoples on matters affecting them,” because the text did “not
acknowledge the rights of third parties–in particular, their rights to access
indigenous land and heritage and cultural objects where appropriate under
national law.” 140 With the change of government in Australia, Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd announced on April 3, 2009 Australian support for the
Declaration.141 In 2010, the other three opposing states also indicated their
support for the Declaration.142 However, as will be mentioned below, in the
negotiations within WIPO for an international sui generis law to protect
traditional cultural expressions and traditional knowledge, Australia,
together with the other opponent states, continues to be an unenthusiastic
supporter of this proposal.
One unstated reason why Australia, together with the United States,
New Zealand and Canada, opposes the kind of rights contained in the
UNDRIP is that from the date of the first Indigenous Peoples declaration, the
protection of the sacred beliefs, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions of Indigenous Peoples has been linked with the issue of
political self-determination. The International Labour Organization (“ILO”)
Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, which had entered into force on September 5, 1991
called attention to the distinctive contribution of indigenous peoples to
cultural diversity and affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to selfidentification. The Kari-Oca Declaration, issued on May 30, 1992 and
agreed upon in Brazil by indigenous peoples from the Americas, Asia,
Africa, Australia, Europe and the Pacific, 143 asserted that:
140

Id.
Experts Hail Australia’s Backing of UN Declaration of Indigenous People’s Rights, UNITED
NATIONS NEWS CENTRE, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=3038
2.
142
New Zealand announced its official endorsement of the Declaration on April 18, 2010. See Pita
Sharples, New Zealand Statement on Adoption of Declaration at UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous
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.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view =article &id =4850:new-zealand-statement-on-adoption-ofdeclaration-at-un-permanent-forum-on-indigenous-issues&catid=58:oceania-indigenouspeoples&Itemid=80 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). Canada announced its official endorsement on Nov. 12,
2010. See Canada Endorses the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
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(Nov.
12,
2010),
available
at
INDIGENOUS
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Conference declared that the United States would sign the declaration. See VICTORY: U.S. Endorses UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, Dec. 16, 2013, available at
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/united-states/victory-us-endorses-un-declaration-rights-indigenouspeoples).
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See THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ON TERRITORY, ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 136.
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We, the Indigenous peoples, maintain our inherent rights to
self-determination. We have always had the right to decide our
own forms of government, to use our own laws, to raise and
educate our children, to our own cultural identity without
interference.
Twenty years later on June 19, 2012, on the occasion of the Rio+20 Earth
Summit the Kari-Oca 2 Declaration was issued by 500 representatives of
Indigenous Peoples from around the world. 144 As with the original
Declaration it combined concerns with access to biological resources,
intellectual property rights and self determination in the following terms:
As peoples, we reaffirm our rights to self-determination and to
own, control and manage our traditional lands and territories,
waters and other resources. Our lands and territories are at the
core of our existence–we are the land and the land is us; we
have a distinct spiritual and material relationship with our lands
and territories and they are inextricably linked to our survival
and to the preservation and further development of our
knowledge systems and cultures, conservation and sustainable
use of biodiversity and ecosystem management.
We reject the assertion of intellectual property rights over the
genetic resources and traditional knowledge of Indigenous
peoples which results in the alienation and commodification of
Sacred essential to our lives and cultures.145
The assertion by Indigenous Peoples to self determination has also
been made by them in submissions to the WIPO IGC on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore. For
example at the 6th meeting of the IGC in Geneva March 15-19, 2004, the
Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (“ATSIC”),
among a number of Indigenous Peoples organizations, 146 submitted that
“[a]n international regime must ensure that the right to prior informed
consent of Indigenous peoples is guaranteed and protected, as a fundamental
144
See Kari-Oca 2 Declaration, INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK–ROAD TO RIO+20 AND
BEYOND (June 19, 2012, available at http://indigenous4motherearthrioplus20.org/kari-oca-2-declaration/.
145
Id.
146
Australia (ATSIC), Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA), Assembly
of First Nations, Call of the Earth, Canadian Indigenous Biodiversity Network, Coordinating Body of
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), Indigenous Peoples Caucus of the Creators
Rights Alliance, Hoketehi Moriori Trust, Rekohu, Aotearoa (New Zealand), International Indian Treaty
Council, the Kaska Dena Council and the Saami Council.
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principle in the exercise of self-determination and sovereignty of Indigenous
Peoples.” 147 ATSIC had been established by the Hawke Labour
Government in 1990 as a body to represent the interests of Aboriginal
Peoples,148 but it was abolished in 2004 largely because of allegations of
financial mismanagement. Then Prime Minister John Howard explained
that, "the experiment in elected representation for indigenous people has
been a failure,” 149 and its functions were transferred to a Government
Department. 150 The abolition of ATSIC was described by Aboriginal
Peoples as “a calculated blow to end prospects for Indigenous selfdetermination.” In this political context, Australian Government support for
the intellectual property aspirations of Indigenous Peoples which have a self
determination implication151 are doomed to failure. This will be the case in
other countries, particularly those where Indigenous Peoples have not yet
established their right to exist as a defined group.
IX.

INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS

FOR THE

PROTECTION

OF

INDIGENOUS

A possibility for the protection of the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal
peoples exists within the negotiations at WIPO for an international regime to
protect traditional cultural expressions and folklore. Agitation for an
international instrument providing for the protection of the cultural and
intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples had precipitated a joint
UNESCO/WIPO World Forum on the Protection of Folklore which was
convened in Phuket, Thailand, in April 1997. One of the results of this
Forum was the institution by WIPO of fact-finding missions “to identify and
explore the intellectual property needs, rights and expectations of the holders
of traditional knowledge and innovations, in order to promote the
contribution of the intellectual property system to their social, cultural and
economic development” in its 1998-99 biennium. Australia was the first
147
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE,
REGARDING
A
PROSPECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL
REGIME
(2004),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ngo/kdc_igc6_doc6_6.pdf.
148
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (“ATSIC Act”) established the
ATSIC, which took effect on March 5, 1990. See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act
1989 (Cth) s 6 (Austl.).
149
See Clark Vows to Fight as ATSIC Scrapped, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 15, 2004,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/15/1081998279884.html.
150
Renamed on January 27, 2006 and currently known as the Office of Indigenous Policy
Coordination in the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs.
151
See H. Fourmile, Aboriginal Heritage Legislation and Self Determination, 7 AUSTRALIANCANADIAN STUDIES, SPECIAL ISSUE 45 (1989).
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port of call for this expert mission, and experts visited Darwin and Sydney
from June 14-18, 1998.
In a note dated September 14, 2000, the Permanent Mission of the
Dominican Republic to the United Nations in Geneva submitted two
documents on behalf of the Group of Countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean (“GRULAC”) calling for the creation of a Standing Committee
on access to the genetic resources and traditional knowledge of local and
indigenous communities.152 “The work of that Standing Committee would
have to be directed towards defining internationally recognized practical
methods of securing adequate protection for the intellectual property rights
In 2000, WIPO established an
in traditional knowledge.” 153
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“IGC”). In March 2004,
the IGC began to consider the ‘objectives’ and ‘principles’ which should
animate the protection of traditional cultural express (“TCE”)154 and this task
has continued through all the subsequent sessions of the IGC. 155 Draft
articles for a convention on TCEs were prepared for consideration by the
17th session of the IGC, December 6-10, 2010.156 This draft has been the
basis of discussions in subsequent sessions of the IGC and the most recent
version is that which was presented to the 22nd session of the IGC July 9-13,
2012.157
In this session, there was agreement that the Preamble in the draft should
contain the recognition that the protection of TCEs should aim to recognize
and promote respect for the spiritual values of Indigenous peoples and
should prevent the misappropriation of their TCEs and empower them to
exercise in an effective manner their rights and authority over their own
TCEs. However, in the substantive parts of the draft there are a number of
options for defining TCEs, the beneficiaries, and scope of protection. This
152
See Traditional Knowledge and the Need to Give it Adequate Intellectual Property Protection,
World Intellectual Property Organization, Sept. 25-Oct. 3, 2000, WIPO Doc.WO/GA/26/9 Annex I, 10, 26th
Sess. (2000).
153
Id.
154
See Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic Resources: The
International Dimension, World Intellectual Property Organization, Mar. 15-19, 2004, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/7, 6th Sess. (2003).
155
The most recent contribution in this regard is The Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Cultural Expressions of Folklore. Revised Objectives and Principles, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/4 17th Sess. (2010).
156
Draft Articles on the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore
Prepared at IWG 1, World Intellectual Property Organization, Dec. 6-10, 2010, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/9, 17th Sess. (2010).
157
Decisions of the Twenty-Second Session of the Committee, World Intellectual Property
Organization, July 9-13, 2012, 22d Sess. (2012), WIPO doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/22/4, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_22/wipo_grtkf_ic_22_ref_decisions.pdf.
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reflects the lack of unanimity of the various blocs of countries involved in
the negotiations. The IGC has referred this draft to the General Assembly of
WIPO, which will endeavor to fashion a consensus document which in the
fullness of time will be referred to a diplomatic conference if it is to become
an international convention. As an international organization of member
states, the representation of the interests of traditional and indigenous
communities within those member states will have to be considered.
X.

THE PROTECTION OF SACRED ABORIGINAL IMAGES AND
AN ASPECT OF NATIVE TITLE LAW

PRACTICES AS

Given that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples define
themselves and their existence by reference to their “Country”158 and given
the establishment of native title rights following Mabo, it might have been
thought that the sacred beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples might have been protected as a native title right, but this possibility
was dashed by the majority judgement of the High Court in Western
Australia v. Ward.159
The first case which raised the issue of Aboriginal communal rights
over their tribal lands was Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd.160 The Yolngu
People, living in Arnhem Land, in the Northern Territory of Australia,
brought this case against a company that had obtained a twelve-year bauxite
mining lease from the Federal Government. The trial judge acknowledged
that “the fundamental truth about the aboriginals’ relationship to the land is
that whatever else it is, it is a religious relationship. . . . There is an
unquestioned scheme of things in which the spirit ancestors, the people of
the clan, particular land and everything that exists on and in it, are organic
parts of one indissoluble whole.”161 The Yolngu’s claim did not succeed
because it was not until Mabo v. Queensland [No 2]162 twenty years later
that the terra nullius doctrine was rejected and the existence of native title
was acknowledged by the High Court.
In response to the Mabo determination, the Federal Parliament passed
the Native Title Act 1993, establishing the Native Title Tribunal to register,
hear and determine native title claims according to the principles established
by the Act.

158
159
160
161
162

See Drahos, supra note 17..
[2002] HCA 28 (Austl.).
(1971) 17 FLR 141, 167 (Austl.).
Id. at 167.
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
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In Neowarra v. State of Western Australia, 163 the Native Title
Tribunal referred to the significance of repainting Wandjina images as
evidence of the connection of Aboriginal Peoples with the land. This
suggests that the spiritual practices of Aboriginal Peoples, inevitably linked
to their land, could indeed be regarded as an aspect of native title.
The High Court, in Yanner v. Eaton, 164 considered an appeal by a
member of the Gunnamulla clan of the Gangalidda tribe from Northern
Queensland who was prosecuted under the Queensland 1974 Fauna
Conservation Act for killing juvenile estuarine crocodiles in Cliffdale Creek
in the Gulf of Carpentaria area of Queensland. The Magistrate initially
found that the appellant’s clan “have a connection with the area of land from
which the crocodiles were taken” and that this connection had existed
“before the common law came into being in the colony of Queensland in
1823 and . . . thereafter continued.” 165 He further found that it was a
traditional custom of the clan to hunt juvenile crocodiles for food and that
the evidence suggested that the taking of juvenile rather than adult
crocodiles had “tribal totemic significance and [was based on] spiritual
belief.”166 The Magistrate found the appellant not guilty and dismissed the
charge. The Court of Appeal of Queensland set aside the order of the
Magistrates Court,167 on the application of the prosecution and the defense
appealed from this decision to the High Court of Australia.
The High Court referred to the observations of Justice Brennan in R. V.
Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Party Ltd.168 that “Aboriginal ownership
is primarily a spiritual affair rather than a bundle of rights,” but that
“[t]raditional Aboriginal land is not used or enjoyed only by those who have
primary spiritual responsibility for it. Other Aboriginals or Aboriginal
groups may have a spiritual responsibility for the same land or may be
entitled to exercise some usufructuary right 169 with respect to it.”170 The
Court observed that “an important aspect of the socially constituted fact of
native title rights and interests that is recognised by the common law is the
spiritual, cultural and social connection with the land.”171 It held that the
163

[2003] FCA 1402 (Austl.).
[1999] HCA 53 (Austl.).
Id. at para. 4.
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Id.
167
Eaton v Yanner; Ex parte Eaton (Unreported, Court of Appeal of Queensland, 27 Feb. 1998).
168
(1982) 158 CLR 327 (Austl.).
169
Usufruct, derived from civil law, is a right of enjoyment, enabling a holder to derive profit or
benefit from land that either is owned by another, as long as the property is not damaged or destroyed. See,
“Definition of ‘usufruct,’ available at http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/usufruct/.
170
Id. at 358.
171
[1999] HCA 53 at para. 38 (Austl.).
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Fauna Act did not extinguish the rights and interests of the Aboriginal
appellant and that by operation of Subsection 211(2) of the Native Title Act
and Section 109 of the Constitution, which provides for the supremacy of
Federal over State laws, the Fauna Act did not prohibit or restrict the
appellant, as a native title holder, from hunting or fishing for the crocodiles
he took for the purpose of satisfying personal, domestic, or non-commercial
communal needs.172
The Native Title Act detailed the circumstances in which native title
rights might be extinguished by executive action. The High Court in Western
Australia v. Ward173 examined the principles of extinguishment in a native
title claim by the Miriuwung Gajerrong people over 7,900 square kilometers
of land and water in the east Kimberley area of Western Australia and part
of the Northern Territory. The Court explained that the relationship between
Aboriginal Peoples and the land was sometimes spoken of as “having to care
for, and being able to ‘speak for’ country” in the sense “that, at least in some
circumstances, others should ask for permission to enter upon country or use
it or enjoy its resources.” 174 This case raised the issue of whether this
relationship between land and Aborginal Peoples could be translated into a
positive right for Aboriginal peoples to insist upon the protection of their
sacred images. Initially, the judge in the Federal Court of Australia had
determined native title in favor of the Miriuwung Gajerrong people,
recognizing “a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of cultural
knowledge of the common law holders associated with the ‘determination
area.’”175 The Full Federal Court disagreed, setting aside the lower court’s
decision: “Although the relationship of Aboriginal people to their land has a
religious or spiritual dimension, we do not think that a right to maintain,
protect and prevent the misuse of cultural knowledge is a right in relation to
land of the kind that can be the subject of a determination of native title.” 176
The appellants to the High Court submitted that the Full Court had erred and
that the first determination should be restored.
The majority of the High Court pointed out that the first difficulty in the path
of that submission was the imprecision of the term “cultural knowledge” and
the apparent lack of any specific content given it by factual findings made at
trial.177 The Court acknowledged that, “access to sites where artworks on
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at para. 39.
[2002] HCA 28 (Austl.).
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Quoted in [2002] HCA 28 at para. 40.
(2000) 99 FCR 316 at 483 [666] (Austl.).
[2002] HCA 28 at para. 58 (Austl.).
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rock are located, or ceremonies are performed, the traditional laws and
customs which are manifested at these sites answer the requirement of
connection with the land,” required by the Native Title Act.178 However, the
High Court ruled that, “it is apparent that what is asserted goes beyond that
to something approaching an incorporeal right akin to a new species of
intellectual property to be recognised by the common law” under the Act
and that:
The “recognition” of this right would extend beyond denial or
control of access to land held under native title. It would, so it
appears, involve, for example, the restraint of visual or auditory
reproductions of what was to be found there or took place there,
or elsewhere. It is here that the second and fatal difficulty
appears.179
The Majority observed that it “is not to say that in other respects the general
law and statute do not afford protection in various respects to matters of
cultural knowledge of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders.”180 The
general law and statute which the High Court had in mind was exclusively
“the law respecting confidential information, copyright, and fiduciary
duties,” referring to the intellectual property cases mentioned above, as well
as the provision respecting moral rights in Part IX of the Copyright Act of
1968. 181 As discussed above, the Australian case law, however, has
identified a number of limitations of Australian intellectual property law,
and the Myer Review found that the moral rights provisions of the Copyright
Act were inadequate for Indigenous Peoples.
Although in his minority decision Mr. Justice Kirby, a leading Australian
human rights jurist, 182 agreed with the majority that the right to protect
cultural knowledge had not been well defined in the submissions made to the
Court because a degree of specificity was required in determining such
claims. But he pointed out that this itself might sometimes create problems
because of the internal rules of some Aboriginal communities, that cultural
knowledge, or at least some of it, may be treated as a secret: “not to be
shared with strangers to that community whether indigenous or non-

178

Native Title Act 1993, s 223(1)(c) (Austl.).
[2002] HCA 28 at para. 59 (Austl.).
180
Id. at para. 61.
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See R.D.M. Pitty, Michael Kirby: Speaking for Human Rights, in GLOBAL CITIZENS: AUSTRALIAN
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indigenous, indeed sometimes not to be shared even with all members of the
community itself.”183
Mr. Justice Kirby acknowledged that in the cases thus far, the native
title rights claimed had generally related physically to land or waters in a
manner analogous to common law property concepts, but that as native title
was sui generis it not be restricted to rights with precise common law
equivalents.184 He considered that these rights could extend to “restricting
the reproduction of a Dreaming story relating to a particular site, where the
reproduction could be proved to contravene Aboriginal law.”185 Mr Justice
Kirby noted that in evidence, the Ningarmara appellants described the "landrelatedness" of their spiritual beliefs and cultural narratives, 186 and that
Dreaming Beings located at certain sites are narrated in song cycles, dance
rituals and body designs. Because this cultural knowledge, as exhibited in
ceremony, performance, artistic creation, and narrative, is inherently related
to the land according to Aboriginal beliefs, it followed logically that the
right to protect such knowledge was related to the land for the purposes of
the Native Title Act,187. Mr. Justice Kirby asserted that this construction was
consistent with the purposes of the Act, as evinced in the Preamble,
including the full recognition of the rich culture of Aboriginal peoples and
the acceptance of the "unique" character of native title rights and that it was
further supported by Australia's ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 188 He quoted from the Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for the proposition that
such rights include the right of indigenous people to have "full ownership,
control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property."189
Mr. Justice Kirby rejected the misgivings of the majority that the right
claimed was "akin to a new species of intellectual property" pointing out that
it must be accepted that the established laws of intellectual property are illequipped to provide full protection of the kind sought in this case.190 The
perceived inadequacies of Australian intellectual property law, even in its
reformed condition to protect the sacred beliefs of aboriginal peoples has led
183
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to calls for this protection to be guaranteed by sui generis legislation. These
calls have been made by Indigenous Peoples themselves and in the context
of negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).
XI.

THE PROTECTION OF ABORIGINAL SPIRITUAL BELIEFS WITHIN
PROTECTED CULTURAL LANDSCAPES

The protection of significant cultural locations provides the opportunity for
the protection of land associated with the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Peoples. The UNESCO World Heritage Convention
(“WHC”), when promulgated in 1972, sought to facilitate the protection of
monuments and sites of “outstanding universal value.” 191 Subsequently, it
was acknowledged that the Convention should expand beyond architectural
monuments such as Angkor Wat and embrace sites with significance for
cultural heritage. 192 The recognition of cultural landscapes as an explicit
category of cultural heritage was recognized in the 1992 version of the
Operational Guidelines adopted by UNESCO’s World Heritage
Committee. 193 The Guidelines provided for the protection of organically
evolved landscapes that result from “an initial...religious imperative” and
which have developed “by association with and in response to it a natural
environment,” and retaining “an active social role in contemporary
society.”194 An Australian example of such a cultural landscape is the Uluru
Kata Tjuta National Park, in the Northern Territory, which was added to the
World Heritage List as a place of sacred significance to the Anangu
Aboriginal People. It has been observed that “the material forms of Uluru
and Kata Tjuta incorporate the actions, artefacts and bodies of ancestral
beings celebrated in Anangu religion and culture through narratives,
elaborate song cycles, visual arts, and dance.”195 The numerous paintings in
the rock shelters at the foot of Uluru (Ayers Rock) were identified as
physical embodiments of “Tjukurpa,” which is the spiritual philosophy of
the Anangu. 196 These spiritual sites are protected through a Board of
Management which has been established for the National Park and
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administered by the Aboriginal Central Land Council. These bodies
maintain the traditional ceremonial activities of the Anangu and control that
the access of visitors to spiritual sites respects the spiritual values of the
Anangu 197 and can be closed to tourists when ritual activities are taking
place.
Most Australian States and Territories have heritage legislation
establishing registers which list known sites of spiritual significance to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, although commentators have
suggested that in practice this legislation masks the obliteration of
Indigenous heritage. 198 The most significant instance of the failure of
heritage legislation to protect a sacred Aboriginal site was the exemption
from protection of the development of a marina and associated bridge on
Hindmarsh Island (Kumarangk), situated in the Murray River delta in South
Australia. This was opposed by a group of women of the Ngarrindjeri
People claiming to be the custodians of secret “women’s business”
concerning the creation and renewal of life for which the island had
traditionally been used. An application for Ministerial protection was sought
under the Federal Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection
Act 1984. This was referred by the Minister for report under the Act, but a
declaration based on this report was quashed in the Federal Court.199 In May
1995, the South Australian media carried reports on the “secret women's
business” and on June 16, 1995 the South Australian Government appointed
a Royal Commissioner inquire into and report on whether any aspect of the
“women’s business” was a fabrication. The Royal Commissioner, Judge Iris
Stevens’ principal findings were that there was “no suggestion” of
“women’s business” at Hindmarsh Island and that these beliefs had been
concocted in order to persuade the federal government to ban the Hindmarsh
Island Bridge.200 On the publication of the Royal Commissioner’s Report
the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement applied to the Minister for a further
order to prevent the Hindmarsh Island Bridge from being built. This he
granted, and appointed Justice Jane Matthews of the Federal Court to
prepare a second report. Her report201 was on the basis that her appointment
197
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was incompatible with her judicial office.202 There was then a change of
Federal Government and the newly appointed Government then enacted the
Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act of 1996 to prevent any further reference to the
secret women’s business in evaluating the development of Hindmarsh
Island. The Ngarrindjeri challenged the legislation in the High Court on the
basis that it was discriminatory to declare that the Heritage Protection Act
applied to sites everywhere but on Hindmarsh Island, claiming that this was
invalid discrimination on the basis of race. The High Court decided that the
Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act had successfully removed the Hindmarsh
Island area from the purview of the Racial Discrimination Act.203 The final
episode in this saga was a defamation action successfully brought by the
developers of the Hindmarsh Island marina against environmental groups
and other critics of the development. 204 In his first decision, Judge von
Doussa stated that he was not satisfied that the claims of "secret women's
business" had been fabricated205 and the Ngarrindjeri and their supporters
took this as a vindication of their position, although controversy still clouds
the issue.206
A perceived current failure of the Western Australian heritage
legislation is its approval for the construction of an extensive natural gas
mining facility on the Burrup Peninsula (Murujuga), which contains the
world’s largest outdoor rock engraving site, dating back some 30,000
years.207 Extensive destruction of this rock art has already been reported.208
XII. THE FUTURE
Section 51 (xxvi) of the Australian Constitution gives the
Commonwealth government power to make special laws for peoples of any
race. On August 10, 1987, Prime Minister Hawke announced the formation
of a Royal Commission to investigate the causes of deaths of Aboriginal
people while held in State and Territory goals. The 1991 Report of the
202
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Royal Commission recommended that all political leaders and their parties
recognize that reconciliation between the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples and other Australians must be achieved if community
division, discord and injustice to Indigenous Australians were to be
avoided. 209 In April 1991, the Constitutional Centenary Conference
recommended that among other things the reconciliation process should seek
to secure the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples through
changes to the Constitution.210
The current Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Robert
French, who was the trial judge in Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia,211
observed that “the question of statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal
interests in the reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration
by law reformers and legislators.”212 He endorsed the recommendation of
the Constitutional Commission that Section 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution be
replaced by a provision empowering the Federal Parliament to make laws
with respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples “based not on
race but on the special place of those peoples in the history of the nation.”213
In late 2010, Australia’s National Report to the UN Human Rights
Council for the purpose of Universal Periodic Review confirmed the
Australian Government’s commitment to the recognition of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Australian Constitution and had
appointed an Expert Panel to provide options on the form of the amendment
to the Constitution which would achieve this result.214 In December 2010,
the Prime Minister announced the membership of an Expert Panel on
Constitutional Recognition for Indigenous Australians. The Expert Panel’s
Report of January 2012 recommended replacing Section 51 (xxvi) with the
power to allow the Federal Parliament to make laws with respect to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.215 The Expert Panel reported
that its consultations established that “Aboriginal cultures need to receive
209
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greater constitutional protection.”216 It is feasible that with the change to the
Australian Constitution, Federal legislation could achieve the protection of
the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. This
would be legislation in which their spiritual beliefs would be protected as a
sui generis right, rather than as a subsidiary category of some other body of
law. This legislation would establish as a matter of substantive principle, the
right of indigenous peoples to maintain the integrity of their spiritual beliefs
from misappropriation, misrepresentation, adulteration and demeaning use.
A threshold issue will be the identification of those spiritual beliefs. This
will obviously involve some input from the representative bodies of
indigenous peoples both in the formulation of the legislation and in its
administration.
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